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'uring the past year, several Federal
Reserve reports on home mortgage lend-
ing have attracted widespread attention for
what they revealed about racial lending pat-
terns. The Federal Reserve Board, in back-
to-back analyses of 1990 and 1991 data
gathered nationwide, reported that black
and Hispanic applicants are denied credit
at roughly twice the rate of white appli-
cants. And in a study designed to inves-
tigate the sources of differential mortgage
denial rates in the Boston area, that region's
Reserve Bank concluded that lenders ap-
proved conventional home purchase loans
for white applicants at a much greater rate
than for black and Hispanic applicants
who appeared, statistically at least, to be
similarly qualified.
Surprisingly, these reports have elicited a
sympathetic response from mortgage
lenders. Rather than criticizing the studies
as faulty or inadequate on any number of
grounds, as they had done with respect to
previous research efforts, lenders and
their trade associations are now generally
acknowledging that in some instances
housing credit decisions in this country
may have been unfair to minority appli-
cants, even if not deliberately so.
3 Lend-
ers that have already developed proce-
dures to detect such bias are stepping up
their efforts to further ensure equal treat-
ment of loan applicants, while relative
newcomers are scrambling to acquaint
themselves with the best practices being
used in their industry and elsewhere.
Certainly these new initiatives are to be
welcomed, as there is every reason to
think that many lenders and future ap-
plicants can benefit from innovations in
the mortgage lending process. However,
based on our own research, we are con-
cerned that the interested parties will be-
come so preoccupied with achieving
similar approval rates for all racial and in-
come groups that they will ignore several
other important public issues in the opera-
tion of mortgage markets. In particular,
undue attention to approval/denial statis-
tics threatens to distract people from the
broader social objectives of community
lending legislation.
This Economic Commentary discusses
some issues raised by several well-
publicized reports of racial differences in
mortgage lending decisions. We explain
why, even though a creditor's relatively
higher loan denial rate could indicate un-
fair treatment of some members of a par-
ticular customer group, simple com-
parisons of these rates from one lender to
another may actually be quite misleading.
We also consider how recent lending
studies—and their treatment in the press
—have influenced the debate over what
constitutes good citizenship for lenders.
Home mortgage lenders have recently
come under increased scrutiny in the
wake of several published studies
showing that minority applicants are
far more likely than whites to be
denied housing credit. This article
takes a look at some of the issues
associated with those reports and
raises the concern that simple com-
parisons of lenders' denial rates are
not sufficient for grasping the com-
plexities surrounding community-
oriented lending.
ISSN 0428-1276Our research shows that even if all
lenders in a community exhibited equal
denial rates for each type of customer
in their market, it would not necessari-
ly follow that each was fulfilling its
responsibilities for "good citizenship"
as intended by Congress: The legal
standard to which lenders should be
held is neither obvious nor easily quan-
tified. Proper assessment of the num-
bers, more than merely the numbers
themselves, appears to be indispen-
sable to the process.
• Background
In general, the financial and employ-
ment experiences of successful
mortgage applicants differ from those
of the population at large. The typical
homeowner has higher income and
wealth, a more stable credit and work
history, and lower non-housing debt
relative to income than the average
American. In addition, a larger fraction
of white applicants than black and
Hispanic applicants are approved for
residential credit (of all types). The ex-
tent to which objective lending criteria
are responsible for these differences,
versus discrimination based on an
applicant's race, income class, or neigh-
borhood racial composition (redlining),
has been the subject of much analysis
and debate.
During the 1970s, housing policy advo-
cates became concerned that housing
credit was not flowing properly to all
neighborhoods within communities at
large, and that, in particular, some
mortgage lenders were not adequately
serving all segments of their markets. To
address these problems, Congress passed
the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act
(HMDA) in 1975, which required certain
lenders to report, census tract by census
tract, the number and dollar value of
home loans they made in their communi-
ties each year. Next came the Community
Reinvestment Act of 1977 (CRA), which
went one step further by encouraging
(through the regulatory process) deposi-
tory institutions to help meet the credit
needs of their communities, including
low- and moderate-income neighbor-
hoods, consistent with safe and sound
lending practices. Other relevant laws,
the 1974 Equal Credit Opportunity Act
and the Fair Housing Act of 1968 (as
amended in 1988), required that lenders
not discriminate against individual appli-
cants on the basis of race, color, or ethnic
origin, gender, marital status, or religion.
A number of informative studies on
credit markets and race have been based
on HMDAdata, as well as on informa-
tion obtained from other sources, over
the past 15 years. Initially, the HMDA-
based research necessarily focused on the
flow of credit to white and minority
neighborhoods rather than on the treat-
ment received by particular loan ap-
plicants, since that data source contained
no information about individuals. The
general thrust behind these studies was to
determine whether mortgage lenders in
an area, taken collectively, originated rela-
tively fewer loans in predominantly
minority or low-income neighborhoods.
Although disparate lending patterns
were indeed found to be prevalent, the
data did not permit examination of
whether these neighborhood credit
variations arose from credit supply or
demand considerations, or, put differ-
ently, from differences in the lenders'
application flows or approval processes.
Were predominantly minority neighbor-
hoods receiving less credit because of
lender bias, or because lenders were
not encountering comparable numbers
of qualified applicants?" Since the
studies could not adequately account
for the creditworthiness of individuals
or the intensity of neighborhood credit
demand, it was impossible to answer
this question directly.
Still, many observers have been willing
to blame lenders for the bulk of the imbal-
ance.
6 Their opinion has been bolstered
by a number of non-HMDA-based stud-
ies of housing and non-housing credit
markets whose findings are consistent
with those reported above. Consider, for
example, several analyses of credit ration-
ing and market performance based on the
Survey of Consumer Finances, which col-
lects information from a random sam-
pling of U.S. households. After control-
ling for some economic and demographic
characteristics, these studies attempt to
ascertain from households' actual credit
market experiences whether racial dif-
ferences can independently affect
credit flows and the selection of credit
products. The results show that race
matters, although to varying degrees
and with varying ambiguities regarding
its true role in the credit process.
Eventually, many people interested in
assessing the fairness of credit practices
came to feel hampered by the dearth of
information about individual loan appli-
cants in the HMDA data. Moreover,
prior to 1990, the law required financial
institutions to report only their actual
credit extensions, so it was impossible
for outside observers to analyze the fre-
quency with which lenders, either col-
lectively or individually, both received
and approved applications for property
located in various neighborhoods.
Amendments to HMDA enacted in
1989 now require most urban-based
depository institutions (and certain
other mortgage lenders) to collect and
report information on all individual
home loan applications taken, whether
approved or not. In addition, some vital
statistics about the applicants must be
recorded, most notably annual income,
loan amount requested, gender, race,
and census tract of the desired property.
Regulators are charged with collecting
and processing this information to pre-
pare disclosure reports for the public,
as well as to monitor lenders for com-
pliance with both the CRA and fair
lending statutes.
After the 1990 HMDA data were re-
leased in late 1991, news accounts
zeroed in on the rates at which loan cus-
tomers from various race and income
categories were denied credit by lend-
ers both collectively and individually.
As mentioned above, the HMDA re-
ports showed that black applicants were
twice as likely to be turned down as
white applicants, although the denial
ratios varied among major metropol-
itan areas from a low of roughly 1.5 to
1 to a high of about 3.5 to 1.TABLE 1 DISTRIBUTION OF 1-4 FAMILY MORTGAGE APPLICATIONS BY TYPE AND SIZE OF LENDER









More than 500 applications
100-500 applications
Fewer than 100 applications
Market share of institution
More than 5 percent
1-5 percent
Less than 1 percent
Size of MSA
More than 25,000 applications
Fewer than 25,000 applications
Percent minority applications in MSA
More than 22 percent





































































































































a. Lenders operating in multiple MSAs are treated as separate institutions.
b. Native Americans, blacks, and Hispanics.
c. Applicant income less than or equal to $25,000.
d. Census tracts with 30 percent or more of loan applications from minority applicants.
e. Census tracts with 30 percent or more of loan applications from low-income applicants.
NOTE: All figures are based on 1990 HMDA data.
SOURCE: Avery, Beeson, and Sniderman (1992).
• The Boston Study in Perspective
Mortgage and consumer finance stud-
ies of credit applicants and loan origina-
tions have undoubtedly improved our
understanding of some of the important
factors at work in the markets: credit
history, wealth, employment stability,
non-housing debt, and variation of the
loan products themselves (for instance,
conventional versus federally guaran-
teed loans). However, when research
shows that less credit appears to be
flowing to low-income (or minority)
applicants or neighborhoods, it is never
clear to what extent lenders' decisions
are based on discrimination or on objec-
tive criteria related to probable loan
repayment, since race and income are
correlated with many of the important
objective lending factors.
Post-1989 HMDA data offer several
paths for new research. The Federal
Reserve Bank of Boston, motivated by
reports of a 3-to-l ratio of black-to-
white loan denials in the Boston metro-
politan area, took a step in one direc-
tion with its recent study of mortgage
lending decisions there. The research-
ers based their analysis on a sample of
loan applications drawn from 1990
HMDA data, supplemented by additional
information about applicants' economic
standing obtained from the lenders' orig-
Q
inal files. The study investigated the ex-
tent to which both race and many com-
monly cited economic variables accounted
for the observed racial differences.
The researchers discovered that even
after controlling for the major economic
factors thought to underlie mortgage
lending decisions, loan approval rates
for minority and white customers of
the surveyed firms still differed. Factor-
ing in these economic and property at-
tributes reduced the gross ratio of about
3 to 1 minority/white loan denials by
nearly half, to roughly 1.5 to 1. The
remaining difference led the Reserve
Bank researchers to conclude that if
minority applicants had the same non-
racial characteristics as their white
counterparts, they would have experi-
enced a denial rate of 17 percent, com-
pared with 11 percent for whites.
One explanation for this disparity of-
fered by the Boston Fed is that white
applicants are coached and assisted
more extensively than minority appli-
cants—the so-called "thicker loan file"
effect. However, a definitive judgment
will require an investigation of the in-
dividual applicants' loan files, some-
thing that was not done as part of the
Boston study. Other questions remainunresolved as well. Since loan appli-
cants from 131 different lenders were
lumped together in the analysis, it is im-
possible to tell how widespread any bias
might be. Furthermore, the results may
be strongly influenced by a subset of
Boston-area lenders whose credit review
standards and procedures differ from
those of their competitors. And finally, it
is not clear how Boston's experience
compares with that of other metropolitan
areas, especially in those places where
the gross black-to-white loan denial ratio
is substantially lower to begin with.
• Variation among Lenders and the
Importance of Loan Applications
In fact, there is compelling evidence
that, nationally, lenders differ from one
another in many important respects. In
a recently released technical paper, we
analyzed the broad issue of lender dif-
ferences in credit flows to minority and
low-income households (see table 1).
Our examination of all HMDA-reporting
lenders—over 9,000 firms accounting
for nearly 2 million home-purchase loan
applications in 1990—reveals that 14 per-
cent of applications and 12 percent of
loans were associated with minority appli-
cants. However, about 40 percent of all
lenders reported no minority applications
that year. And of those lenders that did
receive minority applications, 8 percent
had no minority originations and 3 per-
cent had only minority originations. Half
of the lenders originated 8 percent or
fewer of their loans to minorities, while
one-fourth extended more than 18 percent.
The question, then, is whether the sub-
stantial differences among lenders in
their credit origination rates to minority/
low-income applicants stem primarily
from differences in the volume of
minority/low-income applications
received, or from differences in the ac-
tions taken on those applications. We
conclude that for the United States as a
whole, the variance across lenders in
either minority or low-income loan
originations, relative to total origina-
tions, is overwhelmingly accounted for
by the variance in application rates, not
by actions taken on the applications.
Moreover, it appears that differences
across lenders in either their application
flows or approval processes cannot be
accounted for by variations in clientele
or loan products. We find that only a
small portion of the disparity in this
regard can be explained by differences
in the type of loan being sought (loan
size, FHA/VA versus conventional, and
so on) or in the applicants' personal char-
acteristics as recorded in the HMDA data
(income, gender, co-applicant, etc.).
Furthermore, most of the cross-lender
variances cannot be explained by the
geographic markets served. When we
compare lenders operating in the same
market, we see that those with high
minority application rates tend to draw
their relatively larger volume of minority
business from a broad range of neighbor-
hoods, rather than from predominantly
minority areas alone. Similarly, those
who process a disproportionately smaller
ratio of minority applications than their
competitors also tend to do so throughout
the market.
• Equal Treatment and the CRA
Equal credit opportunity is only one
aspect of federal fair credit and housing
laws. The larger body of legislation ad-
dresses concerns that housing credit is
not flowing properly to all neighbor-
hoods within a community and, in par-
ticular, that some housing lenders are
not adequately serving all segments of
their communities. With respect to the
broader intent of the legislation, studies
emphasizing minority-to-white loan
denial rates can fail to place the num-
bers in proper perspective. And despite
the clear focus of the CRA and other
fair credit and housing legislation on in-
dividual lenders' responsibilities,
studies of lender bias generally have
not been designed to account for dif-
ferences in individual lenders' practices.
While it is tempting, when comparing
lenders operating in the same market,
to conclude that those with the highest
minority-to-white denial ratios are guilty
of illegal behavior, there are other
plausible explanations. For example,
some may receive a relatively large pro-
portion of minority applications as a
result of aggressive promotion and
product development. Although such
an institution may have a relatively
high minority-to-white denial ratio, it
may be a community leader in actual
credit originations to minority appli-
cants. The CRA requires more of
lenders than merely providing credit on
equal terms to similarly situated ap-
plicants. The entire thrust of the law
has been to encourage banks to seek
out lending opportunities in all the
neighborhoods of their community, as
well as to develop products and pro-
grams that meet the needs of diverse
groups of people.
Moreover, since lenders also vary in
terms of their product specialties (con-
ventional mortgage loans, FHA/VA
loans, home improvement loans, small
business loans, and so on), due allow-
ance will need to be made for effort
and results on several fronts. If public
attention remains fixated on home loan
denial rates, lenders may make adjust-
ments to their product mix, service
areas, and marketing strategies that will
result in more equal denial ratios, but
poorer actual service.
• Conclusion
How low-income and minority popula-
tions or neighborhoods fare in the
marketplace for consumer and housing
finance is an important social concern,
and previous studies on credit availa-
bility have advanced our understanding
of how the markets function. However,
with regard to compliance, the lender—
rather than the applicant or neighbor-
hood—is clearly the appropriate unit of
analysis. Just as previous research re-
veals that neighorhoods' or applicants'
demographic and financial character-
istics differ markedly from one another,
lenders too should be regarded as
heterogeneous in the markets they
serve and in the methods they use to
penetrate them.Research studies suggesting that cer-
tain groups or neighborhoods may not
be receiving their fair share of credit,
or that lenders collectively may not be
complying with all relevant laws and
regulations, must be taken seriously.
At the same time, making judgments
about the actual performance of in-
dividual lenders requires a broad array
of facts to be assembled, certainly
more than just denial ratios.
Despite the legitimate issues about
lender bias that can be investigated
through the lens of loan denials, lend-
ers, community groups, and regulators
still must try to forge a consensus on
the CRA compliance standards. What
will it take for the interested parties to
agree that lender A is helping to meet
the credit needs of its entire community,
but lender B is not? How important is
effort, and how important are actual
results? And what kinds of results?
Our own sense of the CRA compliance
process is that no hard and fast numeri-
cal standards exist because everyone in-
volved recognizes that individual mar-
kets are characterized by different
problems, opportunities, and con-
straints. The very fact that mortgage
lenders differ substantially from one
another in terms of the share of their
credit extensions going to applicants of
different income and racial groups is a
manifestation of that reality. Our re-
search indicates that much more atten-
tion than has been exhibited thus far
should be paid to the pattern of loan ap-
plications reported by lenders. By it-
self, this will not end the debate over
what is expected from participants in
the CRA process. But a broadening of
the discussion, with a shift away from
judgments based on one or two num-
bers, could lead to more informed
decisions about lender performance.
• Footnotes
1. See Canner and Smith (1991, 1992).
2. See Munnell, Browne, McEneaney, and
Tootell(1992).
3. See, for example, "Boston Fed Finds Ra-
cial Discrimination in Mortgage Lending Is
Still Widespread," The Wall Sneer Journal.
October 9, 1992.
4. Using HMDA data, Canner (1981), Avery
and Buynak (1981), Avery and Canner (1983),
and Bradbury, Case, and Dunham (1989) com-
pare the differences in mortgage credit origina-
tions between predominantly white and
predominantly minority neighborhoods in
various metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs).
Schafer and Ladd (1981) gathered information
on some lender-specific, individual mortgage
loan applications in New York and California,
but they aggregate the data over lenders within
MSAs to examine their credit approval actions
collectively. Calem (1992) contrasts the ex-
periences of individual lenders participating in
a Philadelphia-area mortgage-lending plan
with those that did not take part. His paper does
document the existence of lender differences in
the penetration of minority communities, but
the primary focus is on the characteristics of
the voluntary mortgage plan operated by a
group of lenders. Avery (1989) notes the dif-
ferences between studies based on lending in a
neighborhood and those that look at lending
procedures adopted by individual institutions.
5. For a review of these demand-side fac-
tors, see Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System (1988).
6. For a taste of the media's approach to the
issue, see "The Color of Money," Atlanta
Journal-Constitution, May 1-6, 1988; "The
Race for Money," Detroit Free Press, June
24-27, 1988; and "Federal Data Detail Per-
vasive Racial Gap in Mortgage Lending,"
The Wall Street Journal, March 31, 1992.
7. See Canner, Gabriel, and Woolley (1991),
Gabriel and Rosenthal (1991), and Duca and
Rosenthal (1992). Avery, Elliehausen, Canner,
and Gustafson (1984) describe the 1983 Sur-
vey of Consumer Finances.
8. The HMDA data contain no information
regarding an applicant's credit or work his-
tory, wealth, non-housing debt, or down pay-
ment. The Boston sample consisted of 1,000
blacks and Hispanics and roughly 3,100
whites who applied for conventional home
loans there in 1990. The 131 lenders aug-
mented their HMDA data with 38 additional
pieces of information on each applicant, taken
largely from application forms, credit bureau
reports, and loan-underwriting worksheets.
9. Viewing the loan files could shed some
light on this hypothesis, as well as enable
trained examiners to confirm or reject predic-
tions of bias obtained from the statistical
model.
10. Although our analysis reveals substantial
differences among lenders in regard to their
housing market activities, we do not attempt to
draw conclusions about lender discrimination.
Rather, we emphasize that the HMDA data do
not contain enough relevant information about
the loan applicants to draw firm conclusions
regarding the reasons for observed differences
in either application or denial rates. See Avery,
Beeson, and Sniderman (1992).
11. We treat each lender/MSA combination
as a separate firm; our full sample contains
roughly 20,000 lenders on this basis.
12. The current public discussion of denial
rates obscures another important aspect of
CRA, namely, that it allows lenders to fulfill
their obligations in several other ways. These
other channels, which include home improve-
ment and community development loans, need
to be accounted for in the CRA review process.• References
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